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We believe that Dr. Albert King’s letter regarding
the STAR system paper22 is not scientiﬁcally based,
factually incorrect, and illustrates that he does not
understand the STAR system’s methodology. All of
our research from Virginia Tech on this subject has
been peer reviewed and published in open journals. In
contrast, Dr. King bases his comments on a single
reference to an internal graduate student thesis that
has not been peer reviewed, has not been published in a
journal, and which is not publicly available. This is not
how the scientiﬁc process works.
While studying our comments, we ask the reader to
keep in mind that all of this debate comes down to a
very simple question: do you want to buy a helmet that
reduces head acceleration? The STAR system is a
complex experimental methodology that combines
exposure and injury risk based on current scientiﬁc
knowledge. Simply stated, it provides independent
data to consumers to illustrate which helmets lower
head acceleration.
DR. KING’S APPARENT SUBSTANTIAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
In order to understand the severity of Dr. King’s
apparent conﬂict of interest, it is important to
understand the entire timeline of our STAR paper
relative to his letter to the editor. In May 2011, we
published the STAR paper, after a 3-month open
response period, and after full peer-review in the
Annals of Biomedical Engineering (ABME). During
this process, and for the entire next year, Dr. King did
not submit any letters to ABME, nor did he submit
any questions or comments to us regarding this paper.
Once he submitted his letter, we contacted Dr. King,
but he refused to discuss his letter or any potential
conﬂicts. In order to gain clarity, Virginia Tech was
forced to ﬁle a Freedom of Information Act request
with Wayne State University so that we could docu-
ment the following timeline, contracts, and statements.
In May 2012, at the request of lawyers working for
Xenith (a helmet manufacturer), a consulting company
emailed experts around the country looking to retain
anyone who would critique the STAR paper. This
email stated that the Xenith helmet ‘‘did not fare well
in the ratings.’’ They sent this email to Dr. King on
May 9, 2012, and he responded to them within 2 h
saying ‘‘it was a pleasure talking with you,’’ and he
forwarded his CV. On May 17, 2012, Dr. King signed a
contract with them entitled ‘‘Xenith LLC Consulting’’
which summarized the agreement that he would be
paid $400/h and all reasonable expenses for his critique
of the STAR paper.
Over the next several weeks, Dr. King ﬁlled out time
sheets recording his consulting hours as he prepared
his report for this company. On June 17, 2012, Dr.
King produced a draft report on ‘‘Albert I. King Inc’’
letterhead entitled ‘‘Review of the STAR Report by
Rowson and Duma.’’ A few days later on June 21,
2012, Dr. King submitted a letter to the Editor of
ABME that was virtually identical to this draft report.
Dr. King provided no disclosure of any conﬂicts of
interest in this letter. The next day and while the letter
was under review, Xenith began nationally distributing
a report from Dr. King, also dated June 21, 2012, that
was virtually identical to his letter to the Editor of
ABME. This report also does not include any disclo-
sure of any conﬂicts of interest.
On June 25, 2012, based on concerns raised about
potential conﬂict of interest issues, Dr. King was spe-
ciﬁcally asked by the Editor of ABME to ‘‘provide any
disclosures related to this work, in terms of retainers
etc. from lawyers as well as companies.’’ Dr. King
responded ‘‘I received no personal compensation from
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anyone for writing this letter to the editor.’’ For a
second time, Dr. King did not disclose any relationship
or potential conﬂict of interest, even when directly
asked by the Editor.
On June 29, 2012, Dr. King was informed that
ABME had a copy of the May 2012 email request from
a company representing Xenith’s lawyers, as well as a
copy of his June 21, 2012 report that Xenith was dis-
tributing and which was eﬀectively identical to his
letter. Because of potential copyright issues, Dr. King
was asked to write a diﬀerent letter. He was also asked
to complete a much more detailed conﬂict of interest
form. This form speciﬁcally stated that Dr. King must
‘‘report all sources of revenue paid (or promised to be
paid)…from sources with relevance to the submitted
work.’’ On July 19, 2012, Dr. King submitted his
revised letter with a new story about his conﬂict of
interest. In this disclosure Dr. King states that ‘‘I was
originally asked by Xenith Corp to write a written
review of the paper in question with remuneration.’’
As the consulting story unfolded, we contacted Dr.
Kingdirectly and informedhimthatwewereawareof this
serious conﬂict, and we asked for his explanation. Dr.
King refused to respond to our questions; however,
immediately following our inquiry, there were a series of
emails between Dr. King, the consulting company, and
Xenith. At one point Dr. King wrote Vin Ferrara, the
CEOofXenith, and stated that ‘‘I thinkwe should cool it
for a while.’’ These emails showed howDr. King’s report
changed from an ‘‘Albert I.King Inc.’’ report to aWayne
State University report when Dr. King stated that ‘‘it is
now a public document and is likely to receive a lot of
media attention.’’Only thendidDr.King state thathedid
not want to be paid, but he added that ‘‘Mr. Ferrara can
make a donation to Wayne State University.’’
What is clear is that Dr. King agreed to write his
report for payment from Xenith (or their representa-
tives), and that Dr. King deceived the scientiﬁc process
by intentionally withholding information that he had
in fact been retained by Xenith (or their representa-
tives) to write his report.
VIRGINIA TECH IS INDEPENDENT
We have no ﬁnancial interest whatsoever with the
HIT System or Riddell. We have never received any
funding or royalties or promise of payment in any
form from any helmet manufacturer. We submit that
we are one of the only truly independent helmet
research laboratories in the world. Our funding is
unbiased and comes from the NIH, DOT, DOD,
Toyota Central Research and Development Labora-
tories, and Virginia Tech, all of which have no interest
in any helmet company.
THE HIT SYSTEM IS WELL-VALIDATED
Dr. King’s assertions that the HIT System is prone
to large errors are not supported by any scientiﬁc peer
reviewed data. Most importantly, the data collected in
the referenced master’s thesis do not support his con-
clusions. In contrast, there is signiﬁcant literature
documenting the validation of the HIT System, which
includes both laboratory and on-ﬁeld testing.1,5,20,23
We summarize here the large body of research and
development surrounding the HIT System and its
validation, which has been employed on the ﬁeld for
the past 9 years at colleges and high schools across the
country.2,3,6,7,9,10,12–14,17,23,25 The algorithms for the
HIT system calculations were developed in part with
funding from the National Institutes of Health. The
algorithm was peer reviewed and published in the open
literature.5 To date, over 2,000,000 head impacts have
been recorded. These data have resulted in important
coaching and policy changes from youth football to
collegiate level practice schedules.6,8
Additionally, the NFL commissioned an indepen-
dent study to evaluate the accuracy of the HIT System.
This testing was performed independent of anyone
from Virginia Tech. The NFL utilized a linear
impactor and tested a wide range of impact velocities
(4.4–11.2 m/s) and helmet locations. These locations
and velocities were selected following detailed video
review of on-ﬁeld impacts to simulate the range of
head contact sustained by NFL football players. The
data were peer reviewed and published in ABME.1
Speciﬁcally, for the impacts on which the STAR sys-
tem is based (front, back, top, and side), the linear
acceleration correlation is high (r2 = 0.90) between the
HIT system and the Hybrid III (Fig. 1).
Regarding Dr. King’s comments on helmet ﬁt
methods and selection of helmet size for validation, in
FIGURE 1. The NFL test data showing excellent correlation
between the HIT system and the Hybrid III for linear acceler-
ation over a range of velocities and impact locations.1
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our research, and to our knowledge in all associated
published research, the manufacturer guidelines for
helmet ﬁt were followed. A medium-sized Riddell
Revolution football helmet was determined to best ﬁt
the Hybrid III head due to the unique geometry of the
Hybrid III head. The 22.5¢¢ measurement for head cir-
cumference is close to the borderline between medium
and large sized helmets. Head circumference is merely a
starting point for proper helmet ﬁt, with size and shape
of the head ultimately aﬀecting best ﬁt. While the
Hybrid III circumference is slightly over the medium
range, it’s other features (slim jaw line, no ears) dictate
that a medium helmet should be used to achieve the
manufacturer’s recommended ﬁtting guidelines: The
helmet should be (1) be approximately 1¢¢ above the
player’s eyebrows and (2) the skin of the forehead
should move with the front pad. There should be no
room for twisting of the helmet relative of the head.
Dr. King references an unpublished thesis (the
Wayne State study) that claims large absolute errors
when a large Riddell Revolution IQ helmet equipped
with HIT System is tested. Without explanation, a
proper ﬁtting helmet on the Hybrid III head was not
evaluated, but rather a loose ﬁt and a tight ﬁt with a
large helmet. The rationale behind these loose and
tight ﬁt conditions are not well supported by the
methods and data provided in the thesis, but more
importantly, those data are not publicly available and
have not been peer reviewed. Dr. King oﬀers no valid
data to support his contention that the ‘‘the contact
pressures between the helmet and the head were way
above the comfort level of human volunteer subjects
who tested both the medium and large sized helmets.’’
The unpublished Wayne State study performs
impact tests at only one impact speed (9.7 m/s). This
impact speed does not represent over 95% of the
impacts players see in a game,22 and testing at one
speed does not allow for reasonable correlations to be
performed that could justify Dr. King’s statement. Dr.
King’s assertion that the HIT System was validated
against a ‘‘very tight ﬁtting helmet’’ is not supported
by any data in the literature. These examples show the
lack of scientiﬁc rigor and lack of rationale used in Dr.
King’s effort to undermine the credibility of the HIT
System, and subsequently the STAR system.
HIT SYSTEM MEASUREMENTS ARE
CONSISTENT WITH OTHER STUDIES
In one published study, the HIT System was used to
measure head acceleration resulting from impact in 32
clinically diagnosed concussions on the ﬁeld, with an
average linear acceleration of 105 ± 27 g.22 Using an
entirely different approach, the NFL conducted
dummy experiments to reconstruct impacts associated
with concussions observed in NFL games. That peer
reviewed research found an average head acceleration
of 98 g ± 28 g for the observed NFL concussions.19
The fact that these data sets are statistically identical is
important independent validation.
Additionally, Virginia Tech has utilized a more
advanced helmet impact system in parallel helmet
studies for the past 5 years. This custom helmet system
utilizes 12 accelerometers per helmet (compared to 6 in
the HIT system). This system was also validated over a
wide range of impact velocities and helmet locations.20
Its development and use was sponsored by the
Department of Transportation and Toyota Motor
Corporation in order to develop rotational accelera-
tion head injury criteria.15,23,26,27 Unfortunately, each
sensor costs over $10,000 and therefore it is not a
feasible tool for wide-spread implementation. How-
ever, we have collected over 20,000 impacts with the
custom system from over 40 players, and used these
data21,23 to further demonstrate the ability of HIT
System to accurately measure head accelerations in the
ﬁeld during a football game.
ROTATIONAL ACCELERATION IS HIGHLY
CORRELATED TO LINEAR ACCELERATION
Dr. King’s assertion that the measurement of resul-
tant linear head acceleration in the laboratory in the
STAR system used to rate football helmet is ‘‘poten-
tially harmful to players whomay not be diagnosed with
a concussion…’’ is not supported by any scientiﬁc data.
His argument is not logical. Reducing head acceleration
is an important objective in reducing injury risk and
obviously will not have a negative eﬀect on injury inci-
dence. In fact, understanding and managing the energy
transferred to the human body during impact loading is
the basis of the injury biomechanics ﬁeld.
Dr. King claims that it is inadequate to use a test
based entirely on linear acceleration rather than
one including rotational acceleration. He fails to
understand that for the vast majority of impacts, if
linear acceleration is reduced, rotational acceleration
will also be reduced.28 The close correlation between
linear acceleration and rotational acceleration in head
impacts in football has been demonstrated in labora-
tory tests, in the NFL’s video reconstruction of head
impacts,19 as well as the on-ﬁeld HIT System data.23
LINEAR ACCELERATION IS A GOOD
PREDICTOR OF CONCUSSION
Linear acceleration has been shown to be very
well correlated with concussion from head impacts in
S. ROWSON AND S. M. DUMA2514
football.12,16,19 In fact, Dr. King’s own studies have
reported the importance of linear acceleration. Dr.
King participated in and analyzed reconstructions of
concussive impacts in the NFL, and he found linear
acceleration to be signiﬁcantly correlated to the risk of
concussion.16,18 Moreover, he found linear acceleration
is a slightly better predictor of concussion than rota-
tional acceleration alone. A follow-up study by Dr.
King and colleagues in 2004 conﬁrmed these ﬁndings.30
Nevertheless, we readily acknowledge that the complete
understanding of the biomechanics of concussion has
not yet been achieved. We are working to include
rotational acceleration in the STAR system, but this
can only be achieved through the rigorous scientiﬁc
process of peer reviewed studies and publications.
CONCUSSIONS ARE NOT DIAGNOSED USING
HEAD ACCELERATION
Importantly, it must be emphasized that concus-
sions are diagnosed only by trained medical personnel
based on the onset of symptoms. They are not diag-
nosed by head acceleration measurements as Dr. King
contends. The HIT System and the STAR system are
not designed to be diagnostic tools. Instead, they
provide valuable additional information related to
head impacts in football. The HIT System provides
biomechanical data on head impacts experienced by
players wearing instrumented helmets during play. The
STAR system allows a biomechanical evaluation of the
relative performance of adult football helmets in their
ability to reduce the probability of concussion.22 Nei-
ther of these systems could be potentially harmful due
to an effect on the diagnosis of concussion. Dr. King’s
comments on the diagnosis of concussion are ill-
informed.
VALIDATION OF THE STAR EVALUATION
SYSTEM
To further illustrate the validity of the STAR sys-
tem, we compare STAR values against available clin-
ical data. The STAR system predicts the Riddell
Revolution (4 star helmet) will result in a 54% reduc-
tion in risk of concussion compared to the Riddell
VSR4 (1 star helmet). There are two clinical studies to
compare this prediction. First, Collins et al.4 evaluated
over 2000 high school players and found the Riddell
Revolution signiﬁcantly reduced the risk of concussion
by 31% compared to other helmets.4 Second, our NIH
funded research allowed us to collect clinical and bio-
mechanical data that include athletes wearing both the
Riddell Revolution and the Riddell VSR4.24 Over the
last 9 years at Virginia Tech (2003–2011), we have
instrumented our football players’ helmets with the
HIT System. The resulting data allow us to investigate
concussion rates by helmet type while accounting for
each player’s exposure to head impact. For each hel-
met type, the number of impacts not resulting in
diagnosed concussion was compared to the number of
impacts that resulted in diagnosed concussion. Our
data ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant 85% reduction in
concussion risk for the Revolution helmets compared
to the VSR4 helmets [v2(1,153486) = 4.52, p = 0.03].
Our analysis includes 308 instrumented player-years
with 153,486 head impacts and eliminates the previous
criticisms of Collins et al.4 Helmet age was controlled,
as each player had been provided with his own new
helmet of either type. Also, the same physician made
each concussion diagnosis throughout the 9 years. In
summary, the STAR system predicts a 54% reduction
in concussion risk between these two helmet models,
and the two separate clinical studies show signiﬁcant
risk reductions of 31 and 85%.
Another study by the NFL examined the impact
response of modern helmets using a linear impactor.28
A wide range of impact velocities and helmet locations
were utilized and the data were summarized and pro-
vided to the NFL players. The rank order of helmets
between the NFL linear impactor testing and the
results from the STAR system are very similar. The only
exception is the Xenith X1, which we ranked highly (4
stars), but the NFL found to be a poor performer. It is
possible Xenith improved the design since the NFL tests
were run, which was several years before our tests.
INJURY RISK CURVES ARE DEPENDENT ON
THE UNDERLYING DATA
Dr. King fails to consider that an injury risk curve is
not only dependent on the injury data, but also the full
exposure data associated with no injury. Due to the
challenging and time consuming testing methods used
by Pellman et al.19, those researchers could only
recreate 31 impacts in the laboratory, which resulted in
a dataset that was biased toward concussive impacts
because they could not account for all the impacts that
a player experienced not resulting in diagnosed con-
cussion. This means that the injury risk curves devel-
oped by Pellman et al.19 overestimate the risk of injury.
A strength of HIT System is its ability to capture each
impact that a player experiences, providing the full
exposure data. Previous studies have shown that there
are a great number of impacts that result in high head
accelerations that do not result in diagnosed concus-
sion.12,21 Unlike risk curves developed from laboratory
reconstructions, the injury risk curve in the current
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manuscript considers the full exposure of all impacts,
and is based on the data collected. Dr. King then
makes an unsubstantiated leap to link the scientiﬁc
ﬁndings of our published study to his opinion that the
HIT System is prone to large errors. We cannot
appreciate his motivation for this comment.
NOCSAE DROP TESTS
To help Dr. King understand the ﬁndings of the
STAR paper, we have provided plots below of the
data from the 132 drop tests performed on 3 Riddell
VSR4 helmets, with quadratic regression lines for
each impact location (Fig. 2). As is standard scientiﬁc
practice, we demonstrated the goodness of ﬁt
(r2 = 0.99) and used these quadratic regressions to
interpolate the values.
TYPOGRAPHICAL COMMENTS
Dr. King is wrong in asserting that there is a deci-
mal point error in Table 6. Contrary to Dr. King’s
comment, the injury risk analysis utilized in the STAR
system is not dependent on impact location. If
Dr. King was confused, he could have asked for
clariﬁcation, or referenced any of the material on our
website that we developed to help people understand
and recreate the STAR system.24
Dr. King is wrong in asserting that the STAR sys-
tem is ﬂawed because he was not able to reproduce the
injury risk curve. The STAR system utilizes an injury
risk curve based on collegiate football concussion
incidence rates. The collegiate coeﬃcients in Table 5 of
the STAR paper for the risk curve are correct, and
simply need to be plugged into Eq. (6) of the STAR
paper. Several other researchers have been able to
recreate and use this injury risk curve from the
paper.11,29 The coefﬁcients provided in Table 5 have
been plugged into Eq. (6) to form the injury risk curve
used by the STAR system below:
RðaÞ ¼ 1
1þ eð9:805þ0:051xÞ ð6Þ
The second injury risk curve based on professional
football concussion incidence rates was provided as an
illustrative example, and does not aﬀect the STAR
system. With that said, there was a typographical error
in Table 5 of the STAR paper. The b coeﬃcient for
professional football should be written as 0.0497,
rather than 0.497. This addresses Dr. King’s comment
about re-creating Fig. 6.
FIGURE 2. Peak acceleration data and quadratic regression lines for each impact locations from the 132 drop tests performed on
3 Riddell VSR4 helmets.
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We thank Dr. King for bringing to the readers’
attention to an error in Eq. (4) in the published man-
uscript. During the journal review process, the regres-
sion analysis was changed from solving for drop height
as a function of head acceleration to solving for
acceleration as a function of drop height. Unfortu-
nately, Eq. (4) in the STAR paper was not updated to
reﬂect this. Equation (4) should be written as:
a ¼ p1H2 þ p2Hþ p3 ð4Þ
With this correction, Dr. King’s comments related
to acceleration and drop height should be resolved.
This correction does not aﬀect any of the results in the
STAR paper as the correct values were used.
CONCLUSION
Dr. King’s conclusions are not supported by any
peer reviewed data or ﬁndings. The STAR system is
the culmination of a decade’s worth of research, and is
based on two fundamental principles: (1) helmets that
better manage the impact energy by resulting in lower
head accelerations will reduce the risk of concussion
(2) each test condition is weighted so that they repre-
sent how often each impact scenario is experienced on
the ﬁeld by players.
In summary, we return back to the question that we
started with: do you want to buy a helmet that lowers
head acceleration? The STAR system uses current
scientiﬁc knowledge to illustrate which helmets are
better at reducing head acceleration. We will continue
to purchase the best helmets for the Virginia Tech
football team based on the STAR system.
DISCLOSURE
We have no ﬁnancial interest whatsoever with the
HIT System or Riddell. We have never received any
funding or royalties or promise of payment in any
form from any helmet manufacturer. We submit that
we are one of the only truly independent helmet
research laboratories in the world. Our funding is
unbiased and comes from the NIH, DOT, DOD,
Toyota Central Research and Development Labora-
tories, and Virginia Tech, all of which have no interest
in any helmet company.
OPEN ACCESS
This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits
any use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original author(s) and the source are
credited.
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